In the recent High Court case of Anglade v Transdev Dublin Light Rail Limited & Ors[1], the Court confirmed that the "mere suspicion" on the part of a Plaintiff that an entity may be liable is not sufficient to fix that Plaintiff with knowledge for the purposes of the Statute of Limitations.
The proceedings in question arose as a result of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff when she tripped and fell while crossing train tracks at a pedestrian crossing point in January 2018. She initially instituted proceedings against the First Named Defendant only in August 2020, and subsequently joined both the Second and Third Named Defendants to the proceedings.
Earlier this year, the Third Named Defendant, Alstrom Transport Ireland Limited ("Alstrom"), brought an application before the High Court to have the proceedings struck out on the basis that the claim against it was statute barred. This was in circumstances where Alstrom was joined to the proceedings outside the 2 year limitation period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations for personal injuries actions. In response to Alstrom's application, the Plaintiff argued that she only became aware that Alstrom was potentially responsible for the accident in July 2022, when the Second Named Defendant delivered its Defence, containing specific allegations relating to Alstrom. As such, the Plaintiff claimed that this was the "date of knowledge" for the purposes of the Statute of Limitations and her claim could not therefore be statute barred.
In response, Alstrom outlined that the Plaintiff had in fact issued a "letter before action" against it and seven other entities in December 2018, and had even secured a Personal Injuries Assessment Board authorisation against those entities. As such, Alstrom said it could not be argued that the Plaintiff did not have the requisite knowledge to institute proceedings against it at that time. At the very least, Alstrom said that there was a duty on the Plaintiff's solicitor to make all necessary enquiries at the time and that had they been made, the Plaintiff would have acquired the relevant knowledge far earlier than had in fact happened.
Ultimately, the Court was not satisfied that the letter before action issued by the Plaintiff demonstrated that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the potential liability of any of the seven addressees, given the "scattergun" approach adopted by the Plaintiff's solicitors. In this regard, the Court noted that the letter had made it clear that the Plaintiff was "in the dark" as to what involvement, if any, the seven entities had with the incident. The Court added that it was not satisfied that the Plaintiff had acquired "anything like the required knowledge" when the letter before action issued and furthermore, there was no evidence that any of the entities responded to the letter in such a way as may reasonably have put the Plaintiff under a duty to make further enquiries in relation to any particular Defendant.
In conclusion, the Court outlined that a "mere suspicion on the part of a party, or his legal advisers, that a person or entity may be responsible for the accident, is not sufficient to fix him with knowledge for the purposes of starting time to run against him" and dismissed Alstrom's application against the Plaintiff.
To see a full copy of the Court's judgment, click here.
[1] [2024] IEHC 384
