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Litigant in person runs out of chances after "last chance saloon" warning from the court - Case Comment on Franklin William Rzucek v Alan Vinnicombe

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By Betul Milliner

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Published 27 March 2025

Overview

The recent judgment in Franklin William Rzucek v Alan Vinnicombe (a claim in defamation) is a reminder that the law does not exempt litigants in person from compliance with court procedure, and of the court's wide discretion in making orders for security for costs.

 

The claim

Mr Vinnicombe ("the Defendant") had a YouTube channel called "Armchair Detective BLUE", focussing on "true crime and other mysteries" which looked at (amongst others) the murder of a woman called Shannan Watts, her daughters and her unborn child. A claim was brought against the Defendant by Ms Watt's brother, Franklin Rzucek ("the Claimant"), for defamation and harassment in relation to "unfounded conspiracy theories" and allegations the Defendant published via his YouTube channel.

 

Strike out

The Defendant served several documents in an attempt to defend himself. These documents did not constitute a proper pleading, but over a period two years, the court allowed the Defendant four opportunities to provide a compliant defence, with a final Unless Order being described by the court as the Defendant's "last chance saloon". The Defendant produced a re-re-amended defence and brought an application for security for costs. The Claimant countered with an application to strike out the defence and for judgment, on the basis that the defence remained defective. The Defendant accepted that his defence was not compliant with the civil procedure rules relating to the content of pleadings but argued that he had been unable to get legal advice and representation (due to the cost risks) and was a lay person with dyslexia. He therefore submitted that the Claimant should not succeed in his claim "on a mere technicality".

In her judgment, Deputy High Court Judge Susie Alegre held that the document filed by the Defendant following the final Unless Order remained uncompliant with the procedural requirements for a defence. She described it as "a mishmash of legal wording and vague assertions" which was clearly in breach of the Unless Order. The judge noted that compliance with the rules on the content of pleadings was not a mere "technicality" but a requirement that was "vital to the fairness of proceedings" to allow the parties to understand the case against them. Failure to adhere to those rules rendered it impossible to reply to a party's case or, ultimately, for the court to reach a decision.

The judge acknowledged the complexity and stress in litigation, and the challenges for litigants in person. However, she emphasised that litigants in person are still expected to comply with the rules, and that the Defendant had been given multiple opportunities to rectify the shortcomings in his defence. The proceedings had been unable to progress and had stalled for over two years. The judge was unpersuaded by the Defendant's counterclaim, which was described as a "vain attempt to muddy the waters and stall proceedings" and therefore struck out the defence and counterclaim, allowing the Claimant's claim to succeed.

 

Security for costs

In relation to the Defendant's application seeking security for costs, the conditions for granting a security for costs order were met because the Claimant was a resident out of the jurisdiction (living in the US) and was impecunious and the Court accordingly had a discretion to grant such an order if it considered it just.

The judge reflected that costs are an important aspect of proceedings in cases such as these, where neither party had significant funds, and the cost of representation had a real impact, such that they could prevent a party effectively participating in proceedings. However, evidence of the Claimant's ability to obtain funds had not been provided to the court so the judge was "unable to conclude" that he would be unable to comply with a costs order. Given the Defendant's failure to submit any reasonable grounds to defend the claim she was also "inclined to find there is a high likelihood that this claim will succeed". Ultimately, the late application for security for costs and the likely merits of the claim tipped the balance of fairness in the Claimant's favour, and the judge therefore found that it would not be just to order security for costs for the Defendant and dismissed his application.

 

Comment

This case reiterates the importance for unrepresented litigants in defamation claims to comply with the Civil Procedure Rules, notwithstanding the difficulties that they may face. Despite the Defendant being a litigant in person, and the judge's sympathy for his circumstances, he was not allowed unlimited chances to serve a procedurally compliant defence. The consequence of his failure to do so in the proceedings - which the judge observed had been "protracted and fraught with delay" – became one of the material factors in her decision not to grant his application for order security for costs, despite the threshold for that application being, on the face of it, met. It is worth noting, however, that the late timing of the application, together with an absence of an explanation for the delay, also influenced the judge's decision as she observed that, had the application been made at an earlier stage in the proceedings, it might have been just to award the Defendant security for costs. 

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